This paper explores the role of investment bankers and lock-up provisions in the market for new equity issues. In a sample of 1,948 IPOs, we find support for the notion that lock-ups serve as commitment mechanisms at the time of the IPO. Insiders of firms that are associated with greater informational asymmetries lockup their shares for a longer period of time. We also find that underpricing is higher for firms that lock-up their shares for a longer period of time or lock-up a larger fraction of their shares. The average abnormal return at lock-up expiration is -1.2% on average and is larger for firms that lock-up a greater fraction of their shares and firms that are backed by venture capitalists. This price drop is inconsistent with rational expectations on the part of investors. Finally, we find that earnings forecasts made by both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are more optimistic around lock-up expiration and their recommendations are temporarily more favorable. Moreover, affiliated analysts are more likely to issue "strong buy" recommendations than are unaffiliated analysts at these lock-up expirations.
An initial public offering (IPO) represents potentially the first opportunity that a firm's founders and initial investors have to begin the process of realizing the value for their ownership stake in a firm. 1 We explore one particular aspect that regulates this cashing out by insiders, namely the structure of, price reaction to, and the compliance with investment banker lock-ups at the time of the IPO. Our results provide insights into the role that investment banks play in intermediation and amelioration of potential conflicts between management and dispersed shareholders.
Investment bankers serve an important function in the process of issuing equity to the public in an IPO. They lead "road shows" where company management and the investment bankers meet with potential investors. They collect stated interest in the firm's offering and create a book of those demands. They price the offering and issue securities to investors on the first day of trading. Similarly, they provide price stabilization and make a market in the company's stock for after-market trading [Aggarwal (1999) , Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (1999) ]. In addition, the investment bank usually requires that the firm's management and prepublic investors agree to refrain from selling their stock in the aftermarket for a period of time after the IPO. This agreement is usually referred to as a "lock-up". We explore the motivations for these lock-ups by examining the structure of the lock-up and how it affects underpricing at the time of the IPO. In addition, we explore price reaction at the time of lock-up expiration, the recommendation of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts around lock-up expiration, and the trading activity of insiders before the lock-up expires.
The underwriter lock-up prohibits insiders from selling any of their equity holdings for a certain length of time after the IPO. We explore the factors that influence the length of that lock-1 See Habib and Ljungqvist (1999) . Baker and Gompers (1999) show that the vast majority of insiders do not sell anything at the time of the IPO.
3 management to issue more favorable recommendations to allow them to sell equity [Michaely and Womack (1999) ].
We also explore the price reaction at the time of the lock-up expiration. Because the parameters of the lock-up are well specified (in terms of length and number of shares locked) and known at the time of the IPO, if markets were perfectly rational there would be no average price reaction at the time of the expiration. Indeed, even if demand curves for stocks slope downward, investors should correctly forecast the number of shares that insiders will sell at lock-up expiration on average and hence the average price reaction would be zero. We find, however, a significant drop of -1.2 percent around the lock-up expiration. Our evidence is consistent with downward sloping demand curves and costly arbitrage. In addition, we find that proxies for the amount of shares that are sold by insiders at the expiration, percentage of shares locked and whether the firm is backed by a venture capitalist, are associated with greater price declines.
Our paper is related to several strands in the existing literature. First, an enduring issue in the corporate finance literature has been the impact of trading by informed insiders on securities prices. Two cases initiated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the early 1960s stimulated an interest in this relationship and its implications for social welfare [Manne (1966) ] that continues to this day. An extensive body of research has examined the trading by corporate insiders. Most notably, Seyhun (e.g., 1986 Seyhun (e.g., , 1988 has documented shortand long-run price impacts of trading by officers, directors, and other insiders. We provide new empirical evidence regarding sales by insiders, both at the time of the lock up expiration as well as before the expiration. In addition, we explore the relationship between the timing of such sales and concurrent forecasts and recommendations issued by sell-side analysts.
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Second, the paper also relates to the literature that examines the role of reputation in the going public process and the mitigation of adverse selection. Because the going-public process is potentially subject to Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection problems, it is in the firm's interest to utilize mechanisms that credibly convey its quality. A commitment to not undertake any sale of equity for a pre-specified period of time may be just such a commitment mechanism [Welch (1989) , page 437]. Reputation can have a similar effect. Carter and Manaster (1990) show that investment banker reputation is negatively related to the first day return on the IPO, i.e., its underpricing. They posit that the underwriter is able to mitigate some of the adverse selection problem at the time of the IPO by pledging its reputation of not taking advantage of outside investors. Similarly, Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) show how the reputation of venture capital investors can affect the first day return on IPOs. We show that over our sample period, a lower level of underwriter reputation was associated with greater underpricing, but so was backing by venture capitalists.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the structure of lock-up agreements and potential motivations for lock-up contracts. Section II presents a discussion of our data and initial results regarding the structure of the lock-up. Abnormal price reaction subsequent to lock-up expiration is examined in Section III. Section IV presents results on abnormal volume. We next explore, in Section V, the role of analyst forecasts and recommendations. Section VI explores insider trading before the time of the lock-up expiration.
Section VII concludes.
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I. IPO Lock-up Contracts
Firms wishing to issue equity to the public usually engage an investment bank to underwrite their offering. The investment bank serves several critical roles in the initial public offering process. First, the investment bank helps the firm prepare for the offering. It provides advice on the proper structure of financial statements and helps draft the offering prospectus.
Investment banks often perform due diligence checks on the firm and serve a certification role.
Further, the investment banker accompanies senior management of the issuing firm on a "roadshow" to major investors. At these presentations the investment bankers and the company management have an opportunity to explain the positioning of the company and its strategy.
During the road-show, investment bankers tally stated investment demands for shares in a "book". The book represents a hypothetical demand curve for the firm's stock. One of the critical functions of the investment bank is ensuring that their investor base is broad. The investment banker then uses the book and their own financial analysis to price the shares before they are sold to the public.
When the issuing firm and the investment bank enter into an agreement to offer securities in an IPO, an underwriter agreement between these two parties is signed. As Bartlett (1995) explains, these agreements typically provide that:
"The Selling Securityholders agree that, without your (the investment bank's) prior written consent, the Selling Securityholders will not, directly or indirectly, sell, offer, contract to sell, make any short sale, pledge or otherwise dispose of any shares of Common Stock or any securities convertible into or exercisable for or any rights to purchase or acquire Common Stock for a period of 180 days following the commencement of the public offering of the Stock by the Underwriters." Bartlett (1995) argues that the lock-up, which is "typically" 180 days in length, "prevents a surplus of stock hitting the market all at once." The agreement to not sell or sell-6 short their equity holdings is governed only by this underwriter agreement. It is not mandated by any SEC or state securities laws which regulate insider trading. 2 It is important to note that it is in the underwriter discretion to release any of the securities subject to the lock-up agreements at any time without notice. We provide evidence that this early release is used extensively in our sample period.
Furthermore, the sale of restricted securities, that is, stock purchased in a private placement directly from an issuer before the company is public, is governed by SEC Rule 144.
Rule 144 allows for the sale of restricted securities in limited quantities in the aftermarket.
Specifically, a person who has beneficially owned shares of common stock for at least one year is entitled to sell, within any three-month period, a number of shares that does not exceed the greater of 1% of the number of shares of common stock then outstanding or the average weekly trading volume during the four calendar weeks preceding the filing of a notice on Form 144 with respect to the sale.
Finally, as Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (1999) emphasize, insider trading is likely to be regulated by the firm itself. A large proportion of their sample firms had a policy in place restricting insider trading by employees as well as pre-specified blackout periods in which the company prohibits trading by insiders. Bettis et al. point out that insiders who are governed by these self-imposed company restrictions are sometimes granted permissions to trade during the blackout periods for liquidity or diversification reasons.
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A. Adverse selection and IPO Lock-ups as Commitment Devices
The prohibition of insider sales for a certain period of time is often claimed to be a necessary commitment device to induce the public to buy shares at the offering. Because insiders have better information about the firm's future prospects, insiders may try to take advantage of that information at or soon after the initial public offering. If insiders knew that the price immediately after the offering was unjustifiably high, they might wish to cash out at a high price. Prohibiting equity sales for a given length of time would allow time for the managers' private information about the firm's future prospects to be revealed over time.
The introduction of the lock-up contract drives out potential low quality issuers because they are unwilling to hold their equity stake in the company in the aftermarket. The adverse selection problem at the time of the IPO is therefore diminished by agreeing to restrict equity sales for a certain length of time. In equilibrium, there would be less underpricing than otherwise would have occurred without the lock-up.
One prediction would be that high quality firms will go public with high quality underwriters and thus underpricing is going to be lower for high quality issuers. Furthermore, underwriters would write lock-ups that reflected their reputation. Specifically, the shorter the lock-up, the more reputation is at stake since any adverse information occurring shortly after the IPO will imply that the underwriter may not have done the due diligence appropriately. In equilibrium, high quality underwriters would be able to take firms public with shorter lock-ups and lower underpricing.
Alternatively, high quality underwriters may not be able to separate themselves in equilibrium. In this case, underpricing, length of lock-up, and the amount of shares locked could all be employed as costly signals by high quality firms to separate themselves from low quality 8 firms. As a result, we would expect managers to use the least costly signal in order to separate themselves, which implies that in equilibrium, these signals should be substitutes.
Similarly, underwriter lock-ups might relate to Welch's (1989) model of the IPO as a means to signal firm quality. In Welch's model, firms would want to underprice their offering to signal their quality. High quality firms are willing to bear the cost of underpricing because they are willing to issue additional equity in the future in a seasoned equity offering (SEO). The lockup agreement could serve a similar purpose. It might drive away some low quality issuers who are unwilling to bear the costs associated with locking their shares. Lock-ups would therefore mitigate some of the uncertainty regarding quality. This results in less underpricing in equilibrium.
Unlike Welch, however, insiders care about the price at which they can sell the rest of their shares. Therefore rather than considering an SEO, they consider the price that they will be able to sell their locked shares in the future. Insiders can essentially signal their quality using three variables: underpricing, percent of shares locked, and length of the lock-up contract. In a separating equilibrium high quality issuers will either underprice more, lock for a longer period of time, or lock a larger percent of shares outstanding and subsequently sell at a more favorable price upon lock up expiration.
One critical prediction of both of these stories is that the lock-up will be strictly enforced, at least for the firms with severe ex ante informational asymmetries. In order for the lock-up to serve as a commitment device or as a costly signal, insiders must be unable to sell securities prior to that date. To the extent that insiders engage in early equity sale prior to lockup expiration, it should be primarily the high quality firms that do so.
II. Data Sources
We employ an initial sample of 2,046 initial public offerings conducted over the period Much like previous samples of IPOs, the firms in our sample are small, low book-tomarket firms. The median firm is less than $75 million in market capitalization and has a bookto-market ratio of 0.42. We find that the firms also have relatively low sales. (Median sales for the year prior to IPO are $49.0 million.) Similarly, our sample period is representative of earlier work in terms of underpricing. Mean (median) underpricing is 14.3% (7.5%), similar to the 11 average of 10% found in previous studies [Ritter (1987) Gompers and Lerner (1999) show 82% of venture partnership agreements allocate the same percentage of profits to the general partners of the venture funds. Firms also appear to lock-up a significant portion of their equity. The median firm locks-up just over 60% of its shares.
Panel C provides the distribution of the time to lock-up expiration in calendar time starting with the lowest (45 days) to the highest (1,806 days). It can be seen that while most lockups occur at monthly frequency, the majority of the contracts, 68 percent, are based on 180 days.
There also appears to be a clustering of lock-up lengths corresponding to year-long intervals.
Panel D presents additional information on length of the underwriter lock-up, percent of shares subject to the lock-up, and underpricing. The panel separates IPO firms on the basis of firm characteristics. Rows 2 and 3 provide cross-sectional differences in these characteristics by sorting the IPO sample into two size groups (market capitalization higher/lower than the median firm size, $74.5 million These results appear to be at odds with the previous literature on reputation and underpricing [Carter and Manaster (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) ].
In the last set of rows we split the sample into two equal sub periods, i.e., earlier and later IPOs. It is readily apparent that no significant time trend in lock-up provisions exists.
General lock-up length and the fraction of the firm's equity that is locked are comparable. IPO underpricing, however, does appear to have increased in the latter time period. Finally, the distribution of our sample across the three major exchanges is concentrated heavily on NASDAQ. 88.7 percent are listed on the NASDAQ, 9.2 percent are listed on the NYSE, and the remaining 2.1 percent are listed on the AMEX.
B. Determinants of Lock-Up Length
We next explore the determinants of the lock-up length. As discussed in Section I.A, if firms are utilizing a lock-up to overcome informational asymmetries and adverse selection, then we would expect that low quality firms or firms with less information in the market would utilize 13 longer lock-ups. These firms will need to commit to not taking advantage of their private information for a longer period of time if they are to convince outside investors to buy their equity. Furthermore, we would expect that controlling for everything else, the percent of the firm locked up and the length of the lock-up would be substitutes. Firms can show commitment by either locking-up more shares or agreeing to a longer lock-up. Alternatively, in a signaling equilibrium, higher quality firms would either lock themselves for a longer period or lock a larger amount of shares to separate themselves from low quality firms.
The results in Table II broadly support the adverse selection story. We find that profitable firms, firms with higher quality underwriters, and firms with venture capital-backing all have shorter lock-ups on average. Each of these variables is likely associated with less informational asymmetry or fear of adverse selection. In the case of profitable companies, they are earning money and hence are less likely to fail. Firms with high quality underwriters or venture-backing already have the certification benefit of a financial intermediary and would need to lock up less. We also find, as expected, that the percent of shares locked is negatively related to the length of the lock-up. Thus, if firms are using lock-up structure as a commitment device, then we do find that amount of locked shares and length of lock-up are substitutes. Overall, we find support in the lock-up structure for the notion that the lock-up is a commitment device.
C. Relationship to IPO Underpricing
If lock-ups are commitment devices as widely believed, then they should lower adverse selection problems at the time of the IPO. One such cost incurred by firms at the time of going public is underpricing. Hence, in this section we analyze the cogency of the commitment benefit of lock-ups by examining their impact on underpricing of new issues. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) show that the older the firm at IPO (controlling for various factors), the lower the underpricing. As in Rock's (1986) IPO model, older firms have longer track records which reduces asymmetric information and underpricing. Models of IPO underpricing [see Welch (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , Allen and Faulhaber (1989) ] view underpricing as a costly signal of a company's quality. The greater the uncertainty surrounding a company, the greater the underpricing. A company that has greater informational asymmetries,
i.e., younger firms, firms with low book-to-market rations and few tangible assets, firms with lower tier underwriters, and nonventure capital-backed firms would be expected to exhibit greater underpricing. Underpricing is a real loss for the firms' equity holders prior to the IPO because it transfers wealth from existing shareholders to new shareholders. Table III presents the relationship between underpricing and the lock up contract. The dependent variable is the underpricing of the IPO defined as the percentage return on the first day of trading. The independent variables are the Carter-Manaster underwriter ranking of the lead investment bank, the log of the market value of the IPO in 1992 constant dollars, the percentage of the firm's equity subject to lock-up, the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the firm's market to book ratio, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was financed by a venture capitalist, the cash flow margin of the offering firm, and the length of the underwriter lock-up in days.
Consistent with the argument that the greater the uncertainty surrounding a company, the greater the underpricing, we find that firms with low ratios of tangible assets relative to total assets are associated with greater underpricing. Our other measures of informational asymmetry such as book-to-market and cash flow margin are not related to underpricing. Higher underwriter quality is also associated with lower underpricing which is consistent with the adverse selection hypotheses discussed in Section I.A. Underpricing is also positively related to lock-up length.
This relation is consistent with the commitment story because only high quality firms are able to go public with short lock-ups.
We find, however, that both the log of the IPO market capitalization and venture capital backing are associated with higher underpricing. For example, venture backing leads, on average, to an increase of 5.47% in underpricing. While this result is puzzling, it is potentially explained by both the earlier stage of venture capital-backed IPOs compared to non-venture capital-backed IPOs [see Baker and Gompers (1999) ]. Additionally, it may be that we have not controlled for differences in the industry composition of the venture and nonventure capitalbacked groups. For example, it is possible that far more Internet-related companies are venturebacked and the venture dummy is just picking up that effect.
III. Event-Day Abnormal Returns
In this section, we explore the market price reaction around lock-up expiration. In this way, we are able to provide additional evidence about the role of investment bankers and the function of the lock-up provision in selling shares to the public. We calculate abnormal returns for each IPO beginning in day t-10 through t+10 as the difference between the IPO firm's buyand-hold return and the benchmark buy-and-hold return. We follow Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) and use the return on a market index as a benchmark return. We employ the NYSE-AMEX value weight index throughout the analysis below. 4 In Figure I we plot the average abnormal buy-and-hold return over the 21 event days. From day -10 through day -2, abnormal returns appear to be quite small. From day -1 to day +2, however, abnormal returns are large and negative. Prices drop by nearly 1.5% around lock-up expiration.
While at first glance, the price decline appears to be consistent with downward sloping demand curves, it is difficult to explain the pattern within a rational expectations framework.
The literature on additions to the S&P 500 show that the price increase occurs when a firm's addition to the S&P 500 is announced [Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) ]. The price rises on announcement because investors know that there will be buying pressure in the future from index funds when the firm is added to the index. Similarly, in the case of underwriter lockups, investors know for sure that a certain fraction of shares are freely tradable after a certain date. While investors do not sell everything at that time, the market should get the number of shares sold at lock-up expiration right on average. As such, some prices should decline at lockup expiration and some prices should rise. On average, however, abnormal return should be insignificantly different from zero [Allen and Postlewaite (1984) ]. In order for downwardsloping demand curves to explain the average price decline that we observe, the market must hold incorrect prior beliefs about how much equity will be sold at expiration and must therefore be consistently surprised by how many shares actually come to market. As we discuss below, costly arbitrage might prevent investors from undertaking investments that would correct the temporary mispricing even if they knew how many shares were coming to market. Table IV , Panel A, provides the daily abnormal returns as well as the buy-and-hold returns. The table reveals that every AR from day -3 to day +2 are negative, although only the ARs on day -1 and day 0 are significant.
A. Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we examine the sensitivity of our event study results to the computation of returns [Ball, Kothari, and Wasley (1995) ]. To address the concern that the abnormal return that we document is an artifact of movement of daily closing prices within the bid-ask spread we calculate daily returns using bid to bid prices for those IPO with available data on CRSP.
Since CRSP provides daily closing bid and ask prices for NASDAQ stocks, we employ this subset (1,712 firms) in the following analysis. The results are given in Table IV , Panel B.
We see that the results from Panel A were not an artifact of trading and market microstructure problems. The bid-to-bid analysis reveals price declines from day -1 to day +1 of similar magnitude, i.e., declines of nearly -1.7%.
B. Cross Sectional differences in Abnormal Returns
In this subsection we report additional information regarding the negative abnormal return that we documented earlier. Specifically, in Table V we examine the relationship between the characteristics of the IPO and the abnormal return at the time of the lock-up expiration. We examine the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the event window from day -2 to day +2. We find that every variable associated with lower informational asymmetries, i.e., larger size, higher underwriter ranking, and venture capital-backing, is associated with greater price declines at lock-up expiration.
We extend the analysis in Table VI by examining the determinants of the price decline at lock-up expiration. The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold abnormal return from two days prior to two days after the expiration of the underwriter lock-up. The independent variables are the Carter-Manaster underwriter ranking of the lead investment bank, the log of the market value of the IPO in 1992 constant dollars, the percentage of the firm's equity subject to lock-up, the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the firm's market to book ratio, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was financed by a venture capitalist, the cash flow margin of the offering firm, the length of the underwriter lock-up in days, and the IPO underpricing.
The results show that the negative abnormal return at lock-up expiration is increasing in the percentage of shares locked. If greater amount of shares are sold on average for firms that lock a larger fractions of their equity, then the larger price decline is consistent with a larger increase in the supply of shares. We find that firms with low book-to-market ratios have larger price declines. Low book-to-market ratios are usually assumed to be associated with fast growing firms. As discussed below, the drop at lock-up expiration is consistent with either incorrect beliefs by the market or downward-sloping demand curves with costly arbitrage. It is possible that investors are, on average, more optimistic about low book-to-market firms.
Alternatively, demand curves for low book-to-market stocks may be less elastic. Finally, we see that the presence of high quality underwriter leads to a lower drop upon lock-up expiration controlling for other factors.
Perhaps most surprising, however, is the coefficient on the venture capital-backing dummy variable. Firms that are backed by venture capitalists have price declines that are more than 2% greater than other firms at lock-up expiration. This seems particularly troubling if venture capitalists are concerned about their reputation in the public market. One possible explanation, however, is the venture capitalists' need to exit investments. Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that venture capitalists distribute equity in the companies that they finance to their investors. These investors, e.g., pension funds and endowments, normally sell their equity stake immediately. Many venture capitalists are required to distribute their shares as soon as the lockup expires. As such, venture capital-backed companies may be associated with a larger number of shares coming to market on the expiration of the lock-up. This would be associated with a greater price decline if investors are consistently surprised by the increase in the public float for venture capital-backed companies and arbitrage is costly.
C. Downward-sloping Demand Curves
In this section, we provide a framework to understand the price decline at lock-up expiration. Considerable debate has developed in the finance literature about whether demand curves for shares are perfectly elastic. The early work of Scholes (1972) seemed to indicate that price changes were not related to the size of the change in the number of shares. Shleifer (1986) , Harris and Gurel (1986) , and Bagwell (1992), however, provide evidence that demand curves for shares may slope downwards.
If the demand for shares is not totally elastic, then increasing the supply of shares would decrease their price. Assuming a rational expectations framework, and no market frictions, then any known increase in the number of shares will be imputed in the price on the day the information is revealed. In the literature on S&P 500 additions [Shleifer (1986) , Harris and Gurel (1986) ], the price impact occurs on the date of the announcement. Because the quantity of shares locked-up and the expiration date of the lock-up are known with certainty at the time of the IPO, there should be no price decline, on average, at lock-up expiration. Investors would sometimes overestimate the number of shares that would come to market and sometimes underestimate the number of shares. On average, however, the market would get the shares sold at lock-up expiration right. The average price response would therefore be zero [Allen and Postlewaite (1984) ].
The abnormal return that we document may not be easily arbitraged since it is likely to be costly as well as risky [Pontiff (1996) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ]. In the case of the lockup, investors may know with certainty that the price will decline in the future because of a future increase in supply, but investors may not want to try to "bet against" the stock by selling it short.
Because these firms are very volatile, some piece of good news may come to market that increases the price and causes a loss on the short position before the expiration of the lock-up.
Indeed, 42.9% of the event-day abnormal returns that we calculate are actually positive.
Furthermore, in unreported results, we find that transaction costs completely eliminate the abnormal return that we calculate. Finally, it may simply be hard to borrow shares in order to set up a short position given the small amount of shares that have been floated. Therefore, even if the market knows with high degree of certainty the number of shares that will come to market, costly arbitrage may imply that the price may still decline on average at the expiration of the lock-up.
In this case, we would expect that proxies for the amount of shares that come to market at the expiration of the lock-up would be significantly related to the price decline. For example, firms with a larger fraction of their shares locked-up would have greater shares brought to market, on average, and would potentially have greater price declines. Similarly, firms backed by venture capitalists are more likely to have price declines at the time of the lock-up expiration.
Many venture firms are required to distribute securities in the companies that go public once lock-ups expire [Gompers and Lerner (1998) ]. Most investors who receive the distributed shares sell them automatically. Therefore, firms that are venture capital-financed are likely to have 21 more shares sold at the lock-up expiration and hence have greater price declines. These are the results that we find in Table VI .
IV. Abnormal Volume
The propensity of insiders to sell at the termination of the lock-up leads us naturally to examine abnormal volume around the event. Some of this abnormal volume will represent shares which are being sold on the market for the first time. A large part of the volume, however, may be due to increased information flowing to the market as investors observe insiders selling activity. We calculate abnormal volume as in Brav and Heaton (1999) . We obtain daily volume from CRSP and define normal volume as the mean daily volume in day t-50 through day t-21 relative to the event day. Abnormal volume is the daily volume in an event day minus the mean daily volume, relative to the daily mean volume. To eliminate the effect of outliers on the analysis we delete observations greater than the 99 th percentile in each event day.
The results are presented in Figure 2 and Table VII . Nearly all of the days prior to the lock-up expiration have positive abnormal volume although the pre-lock-up expiration abnormal volume is only significant on day -4 through day -2. Abnormal volume from day 0 to day 4, however, is very large and positive. Average abnormal volume ranges from 20% to more than 50%.
In order to understand the relationship between abnormal returns and abnormal volume, we undertake the same analyses with abnormal volume here that we performed for abnormal returns above. In the second column of is 26% greater for venture capital-backed companies at lock-up expiration on average. Once again, the evidence seems to support the notion that the market does not fully anticipate the supply response upon lock-up expiration or that some factors limit arbitrageurs' ability to take advantage of this future increase in the number of shares. When greater numbers of shares come to market on that date, the price of the firm drops by more.
V. Earnings Announcements and Recommendations Around Lock-Up Expirations
In this section we examine whether insiders' selling subsequent to lock-up expirations coincides with two empirical patterns that have been documented recently in the IPO literature.
First, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) "But the firm also has an incentive to boost earnings soon after the IPO to maintain a high market price. The original entrepreneurs may wish to sell some of their personal holdings in the secondary market at the end of the lockup period."
Second, Michaely and Womack (1999) examine recommendations issued by sell side analysts within one year of issuance for IPOs conducted over the period from 1990 to 1991.
They find that underwriter (affiliated) analysts tend to issue more favorable recommendations for 23 the firms they took public compared to analysts who are unaffiliated with the offering. They show that affiliated analysts tend to issue such favorable recommendations at times when the firm's stock performs poorly and that subsequent to such recommendations these IPOs tend to underperform in the long run.
We provide new evidence which links both of these previous papers to the expiration of the lock-up provision. First, we look at the forecast errors of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts.
It is reasonable to assume that prior to lock-up expiration, managers have greater incentive to meet, or beat, analyst forecasts. Consequently, we predict that firms will either manage their earnings or attempt to manage analysts' expectations about future earnings. This in turn is likely to lead forecast errors to be less optimistic prior to the expiration. As managers cease to manage earnings subsequent to the expiration of the lock up, analyst forecasts should appear optimistic, as their forecasts will overstate realized earnings [Abarbanell and Lehavy (1999) . 5 While perfectly rational analysts should foresee the action by managers, we provide evidence consistent with hypothesis described above.
Second, we examine analyst recommendations before, and at the time of lock up expirations. Following Lin and McNichols (1993) and Michaely and Womack (1999) , we examine recommendations made by analysts affiliated with the investment bank that took the firm public as well as unaffiliated analysts. The lock up event provides an additional strong test whether affiliated analysts attempt to issue more favorable recommendations precisely at the time when insiders begin to cash out. We show that recommendations of both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are temporarily more favorable at the fiscal quarter of the event. In 5 Abarbanell and Lehavy (1999) show that, after being rated a "buy", firms engage in income-increasing earnings management and are associated with a high incidence of reported earnings that meet or slightly exceed analysts' earnings forecasts. 24 addition, consistent with Michaely and Womack (1999) , the affiliated analysts' recommendations are more favorable than unaffiliated recommendations at that time.
In Table VIII we calculate the forecast errors for analysts following our sample of firms in the quarters around lock-up expiration. Undeflated forecast errors are calculated as the difference between the analyst quarterly earnings forecast and the actual earnings realization.
Price deflated forecast errors are calculated by deflating the forecast errors by the stock price at the end of the month preceding the month in which the forecast was issued. For each IPO with available data we calculate forecast errors for two fiscal quarters preceding the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires through two fiscal quarter after the event. Quarter 0 is the quarter that the lock-up expires. If more than one analyst follows a given IPO we average the resulting forecast errors. All forecasts are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. First, in Panel A, we present the raw forecast errors and the pricing errors deflated by the firm's stock price for all firms with available data. The results for both measures demonstrates that analysts are more optimistic during the quarter of the lock-up expiration and for the following two quarters than they were prior to lock-up expiration. Forecast errors are substantially higher after lock-up expiration than before. This evidence is consistent with the possibility of earnings management.
Panel B tests whether forecasts issued by affiliated analysts are more favorable than unaffiliated analysts. We determine which analyst is affiliated by intersecting the information in the Zacks database and the information on the underwriter obtained from SDC. We find that both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are more optimistic in the quarter of the lock-up expiration and in the subsequent quarters than they were prior to lock-up expiration. While the affiliated analysts appear to be slightly more optimistic, the differences are small and the time series pattern of increasing optimism is strikingly similar. In Panel C, we repeat our earlier analysis but express the forecast errors in percentage terms. Specifically, for each quarter, we calculate the percentage of forecasts that were ex-post pessimistic, correct, or optimistic. This approach allows for a cleaner examination of the distribution of forecast errors and its relationship to the lock up expiration. It can be seen that two quarter before the expiration 67.8% (14.8%+53%) of affiliated forecast errors and 61.6% (8.6%+53%) of unaffiliated errors are positive. That is, analysts issue forecasts which are predominantly too low. However, at the fiscal quarter of the expiration and afterwards, it can be seen that both types of analysts forecasts become more optimistic. This pattern is consistent with either earnings management or management of expectations by insiders, which peaks at the time of the lock up expiration.
Finally, in Panel D and E we provide a robustness check. We repeat the analysis conducted in Panels B and C restricting the sample to firms that have at least one affiliated and one unaffiliated analysts' forecasts at the fiscal quarter 0. All panels give the same results as the earlier tests. Both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts become more optimistic in the quarter around lock-up expiration and stay that way for at least the next two quarters. analysts. Issuing more favorable recommendations, on the other hand, does not raise this concern. Second, by issuing a higher forecast, an affiliated analyst effectively constrains the company to meet this forecast whereas issuing a favorable recommendation does not.
To examine this, we obtain analyst recommendations for two fiscal quarters preceding the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires through two fiscal quarters after the event for each IPO with available data. If more than one analyst follows a given IPO, we average the resulting recommendations. We tabulate the average and median investment recommendations for all firms with a strong buy coded as a 1, buy=2, hold=3, sell=4, and a strong sell coded as a 5.
Panel A shows that the pattern of recommendations is U-shaped. From quarter -2 through the quarter that the lock-up expires, analysts become more optimistic. The average recommendation improves from 1.76 to 1.54. Over the next two quarters, however, the average recommendation worsens to 1.93. Thus, earnings forecast errors are increasing in the quarters after lock-up expiration (i.e., analysts forecasts are, ex-post, increasingly optimistic about earnings), and their investment recommendations decline.
An interesting difference, however, appears when we examine affiliated and unaffiliated analyst recommendations in Panel B. We present results based on all available data in the first column (All Recommendations) and results based on firms which received at least one recommendation from both affiliated and unaffiliated analyst for the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires (Joint Recommendations). Under both specifications in the two quarters before the lock-up expires, affiliated and unaffiliated analysts have recommendations that are not significantly different from one another based on a bootstrap test. 6 Starting in the quarter prior to the lock-up expiration, however, affiliated analysts give significantly higher investment recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. This is similar to the results of Lin and McNichols 6 We calculate bootstrap p-values for the hypothesis that the affiliated and unaffiliated mean recommendations are equal. For example, for fiscal quarter -2, we pool the recommendations made by all analysts into one bin (119+67=186 recommendations) and draw with replacement 500 samples of simulated affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. We calculate the resulting 500 differences in means recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts and the frequency of simulated differences which are negative. For this event quarter, 63.4% of the simulated differences where negative.
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(1993) and Michaely and Womack (1999) . Perhaps affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are equally bad at forecasting earnings, but affiliated analysts are more likely to issue strong buy recommendations for their stocks. Michaely and Womack (1999) argue that analysts at affiliated investment banks have stronger incentives to boost the stock price of companies with which the bank has a working relationship.
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VI. Insider Selling Prior to Lock-up Expirations
In this section, we explore the extent of insider equity sales prior to lock-up expiration.
Because the lock-up agreement is not mandated by the SEC but is only an agreement between the lead underwriter and the IPO firm, insiders can sell equity if the lead underwriter chooses to "break" the lock-up. If the lock-up is truly a commitment mechanism, then we should expect that the incidence of insider sales prior to lock-up expiration would be quite low.
We obtain insider transactions data from two sources. We first determine which of these sales occurs prior to the lock up expiration and at least one month after the IPO date. The last restriction guarantees that we do not pick up sales 7 We repeated the analysis by comparing IPOs which received only affiliated recommendations versus IPOs which received recommendations only from unaffiliated analysts. The results remain unchanged.
28 associated with the IPO. We eliminate sales when aggregate sales on a given day exceed the reported share volume from CRSP. We also check for incorrect insider sales by eliminating duplicate entries. Insider sales which take place around seasoned equity offerings (obtained from SDC) are deleted as well. The final sample consists of 4131 events by 1168 IPOs.
Table X presents a summary of insider sales prior to lock-up expiration. We find that only 40% of the firms have no insider sales prior to the expiration of the lock-up. 8 Nearly 12%
of the firms have more than ten insider transactions prior to lock-up expiration. The average transaction occurs just over halfway through the lock-up.
Panel B of Table X presents summary statistics on firms which are released from lockups. We find that insiders sell prior to lock-up expiration in firms that are associated with less asymmetric information, i.e., larger firms, firms with higher quality underwriters, and firms backed by venture capitalists. This pattern is true across all frequencies of sales by insiders.
This would be consistent with the notion that lock-ups are less important for high quality companies. The public is potentially less concerned that these firms will exploit some informational advantage by selling overvalued shares.
Our final set of analyses is presented in Table XI . We repeat the analyst recommendation tabulation of Table IX , but now we center the recommendations on dates that insiders sell equity prior to lock-up expiration. We are interested in whether the investment analysts have the same recommendation pattern prior to lock-up expiration when insiders sell as they do at lock-up expiration. Once again, we tabulate strong buy as a 1, buy=2, hold=3, sell=4, and a strong sell as a 5. We see that that the sample of analyst recommendations once again follows the U-pattern seen in Table IX . Analysts' recommendations become more favorable in the quarter that insiders 29 sell, even though the lock-up has not expired. This pattern is true of both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Once again, we find that while the time series patterns of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are the same, affiliated analysts give significantly more favorable recommendations in the quarter of insider sales and thereafter.
This shows that the previous results in Table IX were not the result of some artifact that occurred in analyst recommendations around 180 days after the IPO. Instead the results here confirm that the recommendation pattern of affiliated analysts seems to coincide in periods in which insiders sell equity.
VII. Conclusions
The use of underwriter lock-ups has received considerable attention in the business press and our paper is one of the first to explore their use and impact on financial markets. We find support for the notion that lock-ups serve as a commitment device to overcome potential adverse selection at the offering. Firms that have greater intangible assets, that are unprofitable, go public with lower quality underwriters, and are not venture capital-backed have significantly longer lock-ups. We find that firms that agree to longer lock-ups and lock a greater fraction of their equity have higher underpricing at the IPO. However, contrary to the idea that lock-ups are a commitment device, we find that in sixty percent of our firms, insiders sell equity prior to the expiration of the lock-up because the lead underwriter has released them from the restriction.
Our evidence on the structure of lock-ups is also consistent with the investment banks having an ability to extract additional compensation from the offering. By imposing a lock-up on the IPO firm, the lead underwriter maintains control over the large fraction of the firm's equity that is locked. If insiders want to sell before the lock-up expiration, they need to do so 30 through the lead underwriter. Underwriters would want to impose longer lock-ups on issuing firms to extract greater rents. Those firms with lower bargaining power would find that they have longer lock-ups in equilibrium. Our results support this notion. Profitable firms, firms with more tangible assets, and firms with venture capital-backers who repeatedly bring firms to market, potentially have more options for choosing an underwriter and therefore can negotiate shorter lockups.
In addition, we show that the price reaction at the lock-up expiration equals -1.2% on average. This abnormal return is potentially consistent with downward-sloping demand curves or investors' incorrect prior beliefs regarding the extent of insider sales. Proxies for greater sales by insiders at lock-up expiration, i.e., firms with greater percentages of locked shares and firms backed by venture capitalists, lead to greater price declines. As such, our paper should be viewed as another in a recent series of papers that documents that market frictions and the riskiness of arbitrage can lead to the persistence of mispricing in financial markets.
We also provide evidence on the role of analysts around lock-ups expirations. We show that analysts, both affiliated and unaffiliated, tend to issue more optimistic earnings forecasts at the time of the lock-up expiration. Both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts also tend to temporarily increase their investment recommendations around lock-up expiration although affiliated analysts tend to issue more favorable recommendations at the event [Michaely and Womack (1999) ]. Our finding are consistent with either earnings management [Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) ] or management of analyst expectations by insiders. It is possible that IPO firms tend to "boost" earnings around the lock-up expiration and the analysts extrapolate this trend and improve their investment recommendations. This could account for the increasing optimism after lock-up expiration. Similarly, insiders may choose to release more favorable 31 information just prior to the lock-up expiration in order to boost the analysts' recommendations.
Because the insiders sell little of their holdings at IPO and are restricted from selling until after the lock-up expiration, engaging in this type of earnings management prior to the release is clearly in their self-interest.
Our paper leaves several questions unanswered. We cannot disentangle at this stage whether the pattern of forecasts errors and recommendations that we document is consistent with earnings management or management of analysts' expectations hypotheses. In addition, we intend to investigate how the market reacts to analyst recommendations surrounding lock-up expirations. Does the market understand that these highly favorable recommendations are temporary? Moreover, how do investors respond to the differences in recommendations between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts? The sample is 1,948 initial public offerings (IPOs) from January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1996 for which we could find lock-up information. Panel A provides the annual number of IPOs for our sample years 1988-1996. Panel B presents medians and the 25 th and 75 th percentile information on various firm characteristics for the sample. Market value of equity is in millions of 1992 dollars at the offering price. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book equity to market equity in the first reporting period following the IPO. Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the offering price to the closing price. Percent of offering as primary shares is the fraction of the offering that is new shares. Underwriter rank is the Carter, Dark, and Singh (1997) underwriter reputation rank. Days of lock-up is the length of the underwriter lock-up period. Percentage of outstanding shares locked is the fraction of the shares outstanding subject to the lock-up restriction. Sales is the value of sales in the first reporting period after the IPO in millions of 1992 dollars. Employment is the number of employees in the first reporting period after the IPO. Cash flow margin is the ratio of operating cash flow to sales. Panel C provides the distribution of the time to expiration (in calendar days) of lock-ups. Panel D presents information on length of the underwriter lock-up, percent of shares subject to the lock-up, and underpricing. Both means and medians [in brackets] are presented. P-values for t-tests of the difference in means are presented. The dependent variable is the length of the underwriter lock-up in days. The independent variables are the CarterManaster underwriter ranking of the lead investment bank, the market value of the IPO in constant dollars, the percentage of the firm's equity subject to lock-up, the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the firm's market to book ratio, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was financed by a venture capitalist, and the cash flow margin of the offering firm. The sample is all initial public offerings (IPOs) from January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1996 for which we could find lock-up information. T-statistics are in brackets. The dependent variable is the underpricing of the IPO defined as the percentage return on the first day of trading. The independent variables are the Carter-Manaster underwriter ranking of the lead investment bank, the log of the market value of the IPO in 1992 constant dollars, the percentage of the firm's equity subject to lock-up, the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the firm's book-to-market ratio, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was financed by a venture capitalist, the cash flow margin of the offering firm, and the length of the underwriter lock-up in days. Daily abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns around lock-up expiration. The benchmark return is the NYSE-AMEX value weight market return. Buy-and-hold return is calculated from event day t-10 through event day t+10. Abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the IPO buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-hold return on the NYSE-AMEX value weight index. We report the average daily abnormal return, denoted AR, and the average buy-and-hold abnormal return in the table below. T-statistics are calculated using the cross sectional standard deviation of the firm abnormal returns. 
Panel B:
Bid-to-bid analysis. We obtain daily closing bid prices from CRSP for 1,712 NASDAQ listed firms. Buy-and-hold returns are calculated from event day t-10 through event day t+10. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold returns and the NYSE-AMEX value weight index. We report the average buy-and-hold abnormal return and the associated t-statistics calculated using the cross sectional standard deviation of the firm abnormal returns.
Day From Lock-up Expiration
Bid-to-bid buy and hold (%) The dependent variables are the buy-and-hold abnormal return from two days prior to two days after the expiration of the underwriter lock-up or the average abnormal volume from a day before to day after lock-up expiration. The independent variables are the Carter-Manaster underwriter ranking of the lead investment bank, the log of the market value of the IPO in 1992 constant dollars, the percentage of the firm's equity subject to lock-up, the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the firm's market to book ratio, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was financed by a venture capitalist, the cash flow margin of the offering firm, the length of the underwriter lock-up in days, and the IPO underpricing. The sample is all initial public offerings (IPOs) from January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1996. Tstatistics are in brackets. The sample is 1948 IPOs conducted over the period 1988 to 1996. Undeflated forecast errors are calculated as the difference between the analyst quarterly earning forecast and the actual earning realization. Price deflated forecast errors are calculated by deflating the forecast errors by the stock price at the end of the month preceding the month in which the forecast was issued. For each IPO with available data we calculate forecast errors for two fiscal quarters preceding the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires through two fiscal quarter after the event. If more than one analyst follows a given IPO we average the resulting forecast errors. All forecasts are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. Panel A provides summary statistics for all firms with available data. We report the number of observations in each fiscal quarter, the mean forecast error, t-test for the null of zero forecast error, and the median forecast error. In Panel B we report the same statistics but separately for forecasts made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Affiliated analysts are analysts employed by the investment bank which served as the lead underwriter on the given IPO. We determine which analyst is affiliated by intersecting the information in the Zacks database and the information on the underwriter obtained from SDC. Panel C provides information regarding the percentage of affiliated and unaffiliated forecast errors that were, ex-post, pessimistic, correct, or optimistic. In Panels D and E we examine only IPOs in which we have both an affiliated and unaffiliated forecast issued for the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires (quarter 0). We then repeat the analysis which was conducted in Panels B and C with this constrained sample. The sample is 1948 IPOs conducted over the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . For each IPO with available data we obtain analyst recommendations for two fiscal quarters preceding the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires through two fiscal quarter after the event. If more than one analyst follows a given IPO we average the resulting recommendations. Panel A provides summary statistics for all firms with available data. We report the number of observations in each fiscal quarter, as well as the mean and median recommendations. In Panel B we report the same statistics but separately for recommendations made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Affiliated analysts are analysts employed by the investment bank which served as the lead underwriter on the given IPO. We determine which analyst is affiliated by intersecting the information in the Zacks database and the information on the underwriter identity obtained from SDC. The last row provides bootstrap p-values for the hypothesis that the affiliated and unaffiliated mean recommendations are equal. For example, for fiscal quarter -2, we pool the recommendations made by all analysts into one bin (186 recommendations) and draw with replacement 500 samples of simulated affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. We calculate the resulting 500 differences in means and the frequency of simulated differences which are negative. For this event quarter, 63.4% of the simulated differences where negative. The column "all recommendations" provides the comparison using all available data while the column "joint recommendations" employs IPOs in which we have both an affiliated and unaffiliated recommendation issued for the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires (quarter 0). The possible recommendations are: 1 = strong buy, 2 = buy, 3 = hold, 4 = sell, 5 = strong sell. We obtain our insider holdings data from various sources. For the period January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1995 we collect insider holdings information from the Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings monthly tapes. For the period January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1998 we employ insider transactions data from Disclosure Insider Data Files. The information provided form the latter two sources is derived from individual reports mandated by the SEC (Forms 3, Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities, and Form 4, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities). Then, we determine which of these sales occurs prior to the lock up expiration. We check for incorrect insider sales by eliminating duplicate entries. We also eliminate sales when and a comparison of the aggregate sales on a given day exceeds the reported share volume from CRSP. Insider sales which take place around seasoned equity offerings (obtained from SDC) are deleted as well. The final sample consists of 4131 events by 1168 IPOs. Firms that do not appear in our insider holdings database are considered as firms with no transactions. Panel A provides the frequency of sales for each IPO starting from no sales to more than ten sales, the associated average time of sale since the IPO measured relative to the length of lock up, the average percent of shares locked relative to shares outstanding, and the average percent of insider shares sold relative to shares locked. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for four groups of insiders' number of sales within the lock up period: 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, and greater than 10. For each group we report the frequency of such sales (Freq), the associated average time of sale since the IPO measured relative to the length of lock up (Time), and the average percent of insider shares sold all relative to shares locked as a function of market capitalization, underwriter reputation and venture backing. The sample is 4131 insider sales obtained from 1168 IPOs. For the description of the insider holdings data see Table  VIII . For each IPO with available data we obtain analyst recommendations for two fiscal quarters preceding the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires through two fiscal quarter after the event. If more than one analyst follows a given IPO we average the resulting recommendations. Panel A provides summary statistics for all firms with available data. We report the number of observations in each fiscal quarter, as well as the mean and median recommendations. In Panel B we report the same statistics but separately for recommendations made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Affiliated analysts are analysts employed by the investment bank which served as the lead underwriter on the given IPO. We determine which analyst is affiliated by intersecting the information in the Zacks database and the information on the underwriter identity obtained from SDC. The last row provides bootstrap pvalues for the hypothesis that the affiliated and unaffiliated mean recommendations are equal. For example, for fiscal quarter -2, we pool the recommendations made by all analysts into one bin (342 recommendations) and draw with replacement 500 samples of simulated affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations. We calculate the resulting 500 differences in means and the frequency of simulated differences which are negative. For this event quarter, all of the simulated differences where negative. The column "all recommendations" provides the comparison using all available data while the column "joint recommendations" employs IPOs in which we have both an affiliated and unaffiliated recommendation issued for the fiscal quarter in which the lock up expires (quarter 0). The possible recommendations are: 1 = strong buy, 2 = buy, 3 = hold, 4 = sell, 5 = strong sell. 
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